























A set of axioms which characterizes a preference representable by the iterated Choquet
expected utility is presented. This objective function is attractive since it possesses a feature
of dynamical consistency. Furthermore, we show that under the same axioms the conditional
preference is represented by the Choquet expected utility with respect to the capacity which
is updated according to the Dempster-Shafer rule. We do this by weakening Schmeidler’s
axiom of comonotonic independence to our axiom of constrained comonotonic independence
and by adding the axiom of dynamical consistency.
∗The work reported here is partially supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Insitute,
the Cabinet Oﬃce, the Government of Japan.1
1. Introduction
This paper provides a set of axioms under which a preference relation is represented by
the iterated Choquet expected utility with respect to some probability capacity in a two-period
dynamic setup.1 The iterated Choquet expected utility axiomatized in the current paper is
attractive since it can incorporate atemporal theory of Choquet expected utility, which has been
motivated by huge literature on Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, into a dynamic setup while
still retaining a feature of dynamical consistency. Here, the dynamical consistency means that
observing a state realized in the ﬁrst period should not give the decision-maker any incentive to
revise her initial plan for the remaining period optimally chosen before the observation, which
is a desirable feature for any tractable economic model dealing with a choice over time.2
Furthermore, we show that under our axioms the conditional preference given the ﬁrst-
period’s observation, that is, the restriction of the preference over the realized state, is also
represented by the Choquet expected utility and that the Choquet integral here is deﬁned with
respect to the probability capacity which is obtained by updating some probability capacity
according to the Dempster-Shafer rule, the updating rule which is extensively studied in the
statistics literature (see, for example, Shafer, 1976 and Dempster, 1967, 1968). This provides
one justiﬁcation of a usage of the Dempster-Shafer rule in the literature on learning under
Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity.3
A similar objective function is axiomatized by Wang (2002), who employes a rather com-
plicated hierarchical domain of preferences in order to incorporate preferences on the information
ﬁltration in the Savege-act framework.4 In contrast, we assume that the information ﬁltration is
exogenously given and that the domain of the preferences are lottery acts along the line devel-
oped by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). With these sacriﬁces in generality, however, our axioms
1For the deﬁnitions of the probability capacity, the Choquet integral and other related concepts, see Section 2.
2For example, Nishimura and Ozaki (2001) study a job-search behavior of an unemployed worker whose
preference is given by a general-state-space and inﬁnite-horizon extension of the preferences axiomatized in the
current paper. The dynamical consistency allows them to show that the optimal strategy for the worker has a
reservation-wage property.
3Nishimura and Ozaki (2002) study learning behavior under Knightian uncertainty by assuming dynamically
consistent preferences which are similar to the one axiomatized in the current paper and by using the Dempster-
Shafer rule as an updating rule.
4One of the novelty in Wang’s approach which is absent from here is that it can explicitly analyze the decision-
maker’s preference on the timing of uncertainty resolution.2
are much easier to state and to interpret than those by Wang. In particular, our axioms can be
easily compared with those of Schmeidler’s (1989, ﬁrst appeared in 1982 as a working paper)
pioneering work in the literature of Choquet expected utility. Roughly, we weaken Schmeidler’s
axiom of comonotonic independence to what we call the axiom of constrained comonotonic in-
dependence, which seems to be new to the literature, and then add the axiom of dynamical
consistency.
We see that if both the (unconditional) preference and the conditional preference are
represented by the noniterated Choquet expected utilities with respect to some probability
capacity, which would be the case if we maintain the comonotonic independence, then the
dynamical consistency implies that the capacity must be additive. (Similar observations are
made by Epstein and Le Breton, 1993; and Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993. For more details,
see Section 4.) In contrast, we require that the unconditional preference should be represented
by the iterated Choquet expected utility by weakening the comonotonic independence to the
constrained comonotonic independence. Thus, the dynamical consistency is retained and the
conditional preference is still represented by the Choquet expected utility with respect to a
nonadditive probability capacity.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section provides some preliminary
deﬁnitions which are necessary for the following analysis. Section 3 presents our axioms and
the main results of the paper: the representation theorem and a corollary which states that the
updating rule in the theorem coincides with naive Bayes’ rule and the Dempster-Shafer rule.
The proof of the theorem is oﬀered in Section 5. Section 4 discusses the axioms and relates our
results to the existing literature.
2. Preliminaries
Suppose that there are two periods. Let m,n ∈ N and let the ﬁrst and the second period’s
state space be given by S = {s1,...,s m} and T = {t1,...,t n}, respectively. Therefore, the
whole state space is given by Ω ≡ S × T. A generic element of Ω is denoted by ω or (s,t). Let
Y be a mixture space. We call an element of Y a lottery. For example, if we let X be a set
of prizes and if we let Y be the set of simple probability measures on (X,2X), then Y will be3
clearly a mixture space with the operation in a vector space. Given y,y  ∈ Y and λ ∈ [0,1], we
denote by λy +( 1− λ)y  the compound lottery.5
We follow Anscombe and Aumman’s (1963) framework and deﬁne a simple lottery act
as a Y -valued function on Ω whose range is a ﬁnite subset of Y . We henceforth call it a lottery
act, or more simply, an act. The set of simple lottery acts is denoted by L0. Given f,g ∈ L0
and λ ∈ [0,1], a compound lottery act λf +(1−λ)g ∈ L0 is deﬁned by (∀ω)( λf +(1−λ)g)(ω)=
λf(ω)+(1−λ)g(ω). A lottery act whose range is a singleton is referred to as a constant act and
the set of constant acts is denoted by Lc. We say that a lottery act f is 1st-period-measurable
if (∀s)(∀t,t ) f(s,t)=f(s,t ). As its name suggests, the outcome of the 1st-period-measurable
act is determined by the state of the ﬁrst period only. We sometimes write the outcome of a
1st-period-measurable act f at (s,t)a sf(s) rather than as f(s,t).
The decision-maker’s preference is given by a class of binary relations, { i}i=0,1,...,m,
on L0. We understand that  0 denotes the decision-maker’s unconditional preference and  i
denotes her conditional preference after she knows that si ∈ S has been realized in the ﬁrst
period. The two classes of binary relations, { i}i and {∼i}i, are deﬁned from { i}i by: (∀i)  i
⇔ ⊀i and ∼i ⇔ [ i and ⊀i]. In general, a binary relation   is a preference order by deﬁnition
if it is asymmetric and negatively transitive.6 For each i ∈{ 0,1,...,m}, we deﬁne a binary
relation over Y by restricting  i on Lc and denote it by the same symbol  i, that is,
(∀y,y  ∈ Y ) y  i y  ⇔ (∃f,g ∈ Lc)( ∀ω ∈ Ω) f(ω)=y, g(ω)=y  and f  i g.
A pair of acts, f and g, are comonotonic with respect to  i if (∀ω,ω ) f(ω)  i f(ω ) ⇒
g(ω) ⊀i g(ω ). Note that the comonotonicity is deﬁned in terms of the preference induced on Y
from  i.
Let Ω  be a generic ﬁnite set. A real-valued set function θ on Ω  is a probability capacity
if it satisﬁes θ(φ)=0 ,θ(Ω ) = 1 and A ⊆ B ⇒ θ(A) ≤ θ(B). If in addition θ is additive, that
is, if it satisﬁes that A∩B = φ ⇒ θ(A∪B)=θ(A)+θ(B), then θ is a probability measure. Let
5Here, λy+(1−λ)y
  should be understood as the element of Y into which (y,y
 ,λ) is mapped by the operation
which deﬁnes Y as a mixture space, and hence, it does not necessarily mean the convex combination in a vector
space. Accidentally, it does when Y is the set of simple probability measures on (X,2
X) as in the example of the
main text.
6A binary relation   is asymmetric if (∀f,g ∈ L0) f   g ⇒ g
￿ f, and it is negatively transitive if (∀f,g,h ∈
L0)[ f
￿ g and g
￿ h] ⇒ f
￿ h.4





where a0 <a 1 < ···<a k,( ∀i) Ai = {ω  ∈ Ω  |a(ω )=ai } and χA is the indicator function for
a set A.7 Such a representation is always possible and unique. Then, the Choquet integral of a














3. Axioms and Main Results
We take as a primitive a class of binary relations, { i}i=0,1,...,m, that the decision-maker
possesses over L0, and we consider the following axioms which may be imposed on that class of
binary relations. In the axioms, f, g and h denote arbitrary elements in L0 and λ denotes an
arbitrary real number such that λ ∈ (0,1].
A1 (Ordering) For each i ∈{ 0,1,...,m}, the binary relation  i is a preference order.
A2(0) (Constrained Comonotonic Independence) If f,g,h are 1st-period-measurable and pair-
wise comonotonic with respect to  0, then f  0 g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h  0 λg +( 1− λ)h.
A2(1) (Conditional Comonotonic Independence) For each i ∈{ 1,...,m},i ff,g,h are pairwise
comonotonic with respect to  i, then f  i g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h  i λg +( 1− λ)h.
A3 (Continuity) For each i ∈{ 0,1,...,m},i ff  i g and g  i h, then
(∃α,β ∈ (0,1)) αf +( 1− α)h  i g and g  i βf +( 1− β)h.
A4 (Monotonicity) For each i ∈{ 0,1,...,m},i f( ∀ω ∈ Ω) f(ω)  i g(ω), then f  i g .
7That is, χA :Ω






  ∈ A
0i fω
  / ∈ A.5
A5 (Non-degeneracy) (∃f,g ∈ L0) f  0 g .
A6 (Independence of Unrealized Events) (∀i ∈{ 1,...,m}) f(si,·)=g(si,·) ⇒ f ∼i g .
A7 (Ordinal Preference Consistency) (∀i ∈{ 1,...,m})(∀y,y  ∈ Y ) y  0 y  ⇔ y  i y  .
A8 (Dynamical Consistency) [(∀i ∈{ 1,...,m}) f  i g] ⇒ f  0 g .
We discuss each axiom in the next section.
The main results of this paper are the following theorem and corollary. The theorem
shows that under Axioms A1-A8, the unconditional preference  0 is represented by an iterated
Choquet expected utility with respect to some class of probability capacities (see (1) in the
Theorem) and each conditional preference  i is represented by its restriction over {si}×T (see
(2) in the Theorem). The proof of the Theorem is relegated to Section 5.
Theorem. A class of binary relations, { i}m
i=0, satisﬁes A1-A8 if and only if there exist
a unique probability capacity θ0 on S, a unique class of probability capacities  θsi m
i=1 on T and
a nonconstant aﬃne function u : Y → R, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation,
such that


















We now turn to the corollary. Let ˆ θ0 be any probability capacity on S and let  ˆ θsi m
i=1
be any class of probability capacities on T. Deﬁne a real-valued set function ˆ θ on Ω by





χA(s,t) ˆ θs(dt) ˆ θ0(ds). (3)
It follows immediately that ˆ θ(φ)=0 ,ˆ θ(Ω) = 1 and A ⊆ B ⇒ ˆ θ(A) ≤ ˆ θ(B). Therefore, ˆ θ is a
probability capacity on Ω.
First, we observe8 that (∀E ⊆ S)(∀F ⊆ T)





χE×F(s,t) ˆ θs(dt) ˆ θ0(ds)=

S
ˆ θs(F)χE(s) ˆ θ0(ds),
8Similar observations to those in this and the next paragraphs are also made by Wang (2002).6
from which it follows that
(∀E) ˆ θ(E × T)=

S
ˆ θs(T)χE(s) ˆ θ0(ds)=ˆ θ0(E)
and (∀i)(∀F) ˆ θ({si}×F)=

S
ˆ θs(F)χ{si}(s) ˆ θ0(ds)=ˆ θ0({si})ˆ θsi(F).







as far as the denominators are non-zero. This is an update rule which would be obtained if we
simply applied Bayes’ rule to ˆ θ by regarding ˆ θ as a probability measure and may be called naive
Bayes’ rule.
Second, we observe that (∀i)(∀F)













=( 1 − ˆ θsi(F))ˆ θ0(S\{si})+ˆ θsi(F)
=( 1 − ˆ θ0(S\{si}))ˆ θsi(F)+ˆ θ0(S\{si}),
from which we conclude that
ˆ θsi(F)=
ˆ θ(({si}×F) ∪ (S\{si}×T)) − ˆ θ0(S\{si})
1 − ˆ θ0(S\{si})
=
ˆ θ(({si}×F) ∪ (S\{si}×T)) − ˆ θ(S\{si}×T)
1 − ˆ θ(S\{si}×T)
as far as the denominators are non-zero. This is an update rule for capacities which is known
as the Dempster-Shafer rule in the statistics literature (see, for example, Shafer, 1976 and
Dempster, 1967, 1968).
By taking, as ˆ θ0 and  ˆ θsi i, θ0 and  θsi i whose existence is guaranteed by the Theorem
under A1-A8 and by deﬁning ˆ θ from θ0 and  θsi i via (3), we have the next corollary.
Corollary. Suppose that a class of binary relations, { i}m
i=0, satisﬁes A1-A8. Then,
there exist a probability capacity ˆ θ on Ω and an aﬃne function u : Y → R, which is unique up to a7
positive aﬃne transformation, such that for any i satisfying ˆ θ({si}×T)  =0and ˆ θ(S\{si}×T)  =
1, it holds that












ˆ θ(({si}×F) ∪ (S\{si}×T)) − ˆ θ(S\{si}×T)
1 − ˆ θ(S\{si}×T)
.
This corollary shows that under Axioms A1-A8, each conditional preference is repre-
sented by the Choquet expected utility with respect to the probability capacity which is up-
dated from some probability capacity ˆ θ according to the Dempster-Shafer rule. Therefore, the
Corollary provides one justiﬁcation of a usage of the Dempster-Shafer rule in the literature on
learning under Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity (see, for example, Nishimura and Ozaki,
2002).
Furthermore, the Corollary also shows that for the probability capacity ˆ θ, naive Bayes’
rule and the Dempster-Shafer rule coincide, which is not always the case for general probability
capacities. This and that the updating rule must be the Dempster-Shafer rule are among strong
implications of the dynamical consistency imposed on the class of (un)conditional preferences.
4. Discussion of Axioms
This section discusses the axioms in the Theorem with relation to those in the existing
literature. The whole set of the axioms are divided into two groups, that is, Axioms A1 through
A5 and Axioms A6 through A8.
Except for Axiom A2, each axiom in the ﬁrst group, A1 and A3-A5, requires that all
of the binary relations, { i}m
i=0, should satisfy the axiom of Schmeidler (1989) with the same
name. Note that, while Axiom A5 requires the non-degeneracy only of  0, Axioms A4 and A5
applied to  0 and Axiom A7 imply that  i also satisﬁes the non-degeneracy for all i (see Step
1 of the proof in Section 5).9
9To be precise, Schmeidler’s axioms of ordering and non-degeneracy are stated in terms of the weak order
while ours are stated in terms of its asymmetric part. Of course, his and ours are equivalent.8
Axiom A2(1) (conditional comonotonic independence) requires that all conditional pref-
erences should satisfy Schmeidler’s comonotonic independence. The motivation for the axiom
of comonotonic independence can be found in Schmeidler’s (1989) original work.
In contrast, Axiom A2(0) (constrained comonotonic independence) is concerned with the
unconditional preference. On the one hand, when applied to the unconditional preference, the
axiom of comonotonic independence would require
A2S(0) (Comonotonic Independence) If f,g,h are pairwise comonotonic with respect to  0,
then f  0 g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h  0 λg +( 1− λ)h .
On the other hand, Axiom A2(0) requires the comonotonic independence to hold only among
acts which are 1st-period-measurable and does not say anything about a triplet of acts at least
one of which is not 1st-period-measurable. Clearly, Axiom A2(0) is implied by Axiom A2S(0).
Actually, it is substantially weaker than A2S(0). We come back to this point later.
Among the second group of the axioms, Axiom A6 (independence of unrealized events)
applies only to the conditional preferences. It is well-known also as the axiom of consequential-
ism10 and requires that if two acts behave exactly in the same manner after the realization of
state si, the conditional preference given si should evaluate these two acts indiﬀerently. Axiom
A6 forces the representation of  i to be independent of unrealized states, sj (j  = i) (see (2) in
the Theorem).
The last two axioms are concerned with the connection between the unconditional pref-
erence and the conditional preferences. The former, Axiom A7 (ordinal preference consistency),
is also well-known11 and requires that all the preferences should evaluate constant acts in the
same manner. This axiom implies that the von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility index,
u, in the Theorem can be taken to be common for all representations (see (1) and (2) in the
Theorem).
The latter, Axiom A8 (dynamical consistency), is a version of a well-known axiom of
10See, for example, Axiom 7 of Ghirardato (2002), which, in the Savage-act framework, axiomatizes the class of
(un)conditional preferences which can be represented by an expected utility with respect to a probability measure
P and conditional expected utilities with respect to the conditional probability measures updated from P by
Bayes’ rule.
11See, for example, Axiom 3 of Ghirardato (2002), cited in the previous footnote.9
dynamical consistency.12 To see an implication of this axiom, suppose that the axiom is now
violated so that there exists a pair of acts, f and g, such that (∀i) f  i g and g  0 f. Then,
there are two possible cases: (a) (∀i) f ∼i g and g  0 f; and (b) (∀i) f  i g,( ∃i) f  i g and
g  0 f, in the latter case of which there exists some state such that the decision-maker has a
deﬁnite incentive to revise her initial plan after observing that state. Axiom A8 requires that
there should be no such pair of acts that either (a) or (b) is the case.
We now turn to a discussion of implications of the axioms as a whole. In particular,
we argue that although the dynamical consistency (A8) seems to be a mild requirement, its
implication is fairly strong in the presence of other axioms. To see this, assume that all the
axioms of the Theorem is satisﬁed. Further, assume that Axiom A2(0) is now strengthened to
Axiom A2S(0). Then, by Axioms A1, A2S(0) and A3-A5, Schmeidler’s (1989) theorem implies
that there exists a unique probability capacity θ on Ω and an aﬃne function u : Y → R such
that







where u may be assumed, without loss of generality, to be the same as the one in the Theorem.13











By considering an act fA satisfying u(fA(·)) = χA for each A,15 equation (5) implies that
(∀A) θ(A)=ˆ θ(A), where ˆ θ is derived from θ0 and  θsi i by (3) right after the statement of
the Theorem in the previous section (set ˆ θ0 and  ˆ θsi i there to be equal to θ0 and  θsi i here).
12Another version of the dynamical consistency, which is conceptually pretty close to ours but adapted to a
diﬀerent framework, appears as Axiom 5 (consistency) in Wang (2002). For the diﬀerence between his framework
and ours, see the Introduction of the current paper.
13From (4), it follows that u is an aﬃne function which represents  0 on Y . The vNM utility index in the
Theorem is also an aﬃne function representing  0 on Y . Therefore, one index is an aﬃne transformation of the
other, and hence, we can take u in (4) to be the same as the one in the Theorem.
14To see this, note that the both sides of equation (5) coincide when f is a constant act. Step 1 of the proof
in Section 5 proves that for any f ∈ L0, there exists a constant act which is indiﬀerenct to f with respect to  0
(see (9)). Therefore, the both sides of equation (5) must always coincide since they both represent  0.
15Such an act certainly exists. See (8) in Step 1 of the proof in Section 5 (let f
A be such that f
A(ω)=y
∗ if
ω ∈ A and f
A(ω)=( 1 /2)y
∗ +( 1 /2)y∗ if ω/ ∈ A).10
Therefore, the discussion there and the fact that ˆ θ = θ show that







It is well-known that the probability capacity θ which satisﬁes both (5) and (6) must be ad-
ditive.16 Therefore, a class of (un)conditional preferences which satisﬁes Axioms A1, A2S(0),
A2(1) and A3-A8 can be represented by an expected utility with respect to a unique probability
measure and conditional expected utilities with respect to the conditional probability measures
updated by Bayes’ rule.
Epstein and Le Breton (1993) observe that in the Savage-act framework, if the uncon-
ditional preference is represented by using a unique probability measure P (but not necessarily
in a form of expected utility), the axiom of dynamical consistency implies that each conditional
preference is represented by using the conditional probability measure updated from P by Bayes’
rule (again not necessarily in a form of conditional expected utility).17 The discussion in the
previous paragraph shows that if both the unconditional and conditional preferences are repre-
sented by the (noniterated) Choquet expected utilities (under Axioms A1, A2S(0), A2(1) and
A3-A5), the axiom of dynamical consistency (as well as Axioms A6 and A7) implies that the
representation of the preferences must be the (un)conditional expected utilities with respect to
a probability measure and the conditional probability measures updated by Bayes’ rule. This is
a variant of the observation made by Epstein and Le Breton in our lottery-act framework.
Furthermore, in the lottery-act framework as ours, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) show
that if both the unconditional and conditional preferences are represented by the (noniterated)
Choquet expected utilities, the dynamical consistency must be violated except for the trivial case
where the capacity is additive.18 In contrast, we require that the unconditional preference should
be represented only by an iterated Choquet expected utility by substantially weakening A2S(0)
to A2(0). By this, the class of (un)conditional preferences restores the dynamical consistency
while still allowing the conditional preferences to be represented by the Choquet expected utility
with respect to a probability capacity which is not necessarily reduced to a probability measure.
16See, for example, Yoo (1991).
17Their work is largely motivated by Machina and Schmeidler’s (1992) theory of probabilistical sophistication.
18To be more precise, they show that both the unconditional and conditional preferences are represented by
the (noniterated) Choquet expected utilities if and only if the class of (un)conditional preferences satisﬁes what
they call an f-Bayesian rule with f being an act which takes on the best and the worst outcomes only.11
5. Proof of Theorem
Showing that the axioms in the Theorem are necessary for the representation is straight-
forward in view of the comonotonic additivity of Choquet integrals (Schmeidler, 1986), and
hence, it is omitted. We prove the suﬃciency of them in several steps.
Step 1. This step shows that there exists a function U : L0 → R which represents  0, that is,
(∀f,g ∈ L0) f  0 g ⇔ U(f) >U(g), (7)
and whose restriction on Lc is an aﬃne function. Note that Lc is a mixture space and that by
A1, A2(0) and A3,  0 restricted on Lc satisﬁes all the axioms of the mixture-space theorem of
Herstein and Milnor (1953). Therefore, it follows that there exists an aﬃne function J on Lc
which represents  0 restricted on Lc. Deﬁne a function u on Y by (∀y) u(y)=J(f) where f ∈ Lc
is such that (∀ω) f(ω)=y. Clearly, u is an aﬃne function on Y . By A4 and A5, there exist
y∗,y ∗ ∈ Y such that y∗  0 y∗. Therefore, by making a suitable positive aﬃne transformation
on u, we may assume without loss of generality that
u(y∗) = 1 and u(y∗)=−1. (8)
We claim that for any f ∈ L0, there exist ¯ y,y ∈ Y and α ∈ [0,1] such that
f ∼0 α¯ y +( 1− α)y . (9)
This holds because it follows from A4 that there exist ¯ y,y ∈ Y such that ¯ y  0 f  0 y and
because it follows from A2(0) and A3 that there exists α ∈ [0,1] such that f ∼0 α¯ y +( 1− α)y .
Then, deﬁne U : L0 → R by
(∀f ∈ L0) U(f)=u

α¯ y +( 1− α)y

, (10)
where ¯ y,y ∈ Y and α ∈ [0,1] are such that (9) holds. Such ¯ y, y and α certainly exist as shown
in the previous paragraph. It is then immediate that U is well-deﬁned and represents  0 on L0.
Furthermore, its restriction on Lc is an aﬃne function since u is an aﬃne function on Y .12





f  : T → Y

 f (T) is a ﬁnite subset of Y
	
.
That is, L 
0 is the space of simple lottery acts whose domain is T. Given any f ∈ L0 and any
s ∈ S, it holds obviously that f(s,·) ∈ L 
0.
For each i ∈{ 1,...,m}, we deﬁne a binary relation   
i on L 
0 by
(∀f ,g  ∈ L 
0) f    
i g  ⇔ (∀f,g ∈ L0)


f(si,·)=f  and g(si,·)=g  ⇒ f  i g

. (11)
We derive   
i, ∼ 
i and   
i on Y , from   
i as usual. Two acts, f  and g , are comonotonic with
respect to   
i if (∀t,t  ∈ T) f (t)   
i f (t ) ⇒ g (t) ⊀ 
i g (t ).
The rest of this step shows that the following holds:
(∀f ,g  ∈ L 
0) f    
i g  ⇔ (∃f,g ∈ L0) f(si,·)=f ,g(si,·)=g  and f  i g. (12)
To show (⇒), suppose that f    
i g . Then, the right-hand side of (12) clearly holds true by the
deﬁnition (11) since we can always ﬁnd f and g such that f(si,·)=f  and g(si,·)=g  for any
f  and g . To show (⇐), suppose that the right-hand side of (12) holds, that is, assume that
there exist ˆ f and ˆ g such that ˆ f(si,·)=f ,ˆ g(si,·)=g  and ˆ f  i ˆ g. Let f,g be any pair of acts
such that f(si,·)=f  and g(si,·)=g . Then, A6 implies that ˆ f ∼i f and ˆ g ∼i g, and hence, it
follows that f  i g by A1. Therefore, f    
i g  holds by the deﬁnition (11).
Step 3. This step proves that   
i deﬁned in the previous step satisﬁes all the axioms of Schmei-
dler’s Theorem (1989, p.578). In the rest of this step, we ﬁx i ∈{ 1,...,n} arbitrarily.
(Ordering) We need to show that   
i is asymmetric and negatively transitive. The
asymmetry is immediate from the deﬁnition (11) of   
i and the asymmetry of  i (A1). To show
the negative transitivity, let f ,g ,h   ∈ L 
0 be such that f    
i g  and g    
i h . Then, by the
deﬁnition (11) of   
i, there exist f,g ∈ L0 such that f(si,·)=f , g(si,·)=g  and f  i g and
there exist ˆ g,h ∈ L0 such that ˆ g(si,·)=g , h(si,·)=h  and ˆ g  i h. Since A6 implies that g ∼i ˆ g
and since  i is a preference order (A1), it follows that f  i h. Therefore, we have f    
i h  by
the deﬁnition (11) of   
i, which completes the proof of the negative transitivity.13
(Comonotonic Independence) Let f ,g ,h   ∈ L 
0 be pairwise comonotonic with respect
to   
i and such that f    
i g . We need to show that for any λ ∈ (0,1),
λf  +( 1− λ)h    
i λg  +( 1− λ)h  . (13)
Let λ ∈ (0,1) and let f,g,h ∈ L0 be such that (∀s) f(s,·)=f , g(s,·)=g  and
h(s,·)=h . This paragraph proves that f,g,h thus deﬁned are pairwise comonotonic with
respect to  i. To see this, let s,s  ∈ S and t,t  ∈ T be such that f(s,t)  i f(s ,t  ). Since
f(s,t)=f (t) and f(s ,t  )=f (t ), it follows that f (t)   
i f (t ) by (12) and that g (t) ⊀ 
i g (t )
by the comonotonicity of f  and g  with respect to   
i. Since g(s,t)=g (t) and g(s ,t  )=g (t ),
(12) also implies that g(s,t) ⊀i g (s ,t  ). The same argument applies to the other pairs of acts.
Note that f  i g by the deﬁnition (11) of   
i and the assumption that f    
i g . Therefore,
A2(1) and the pairwise comonotonicity of f,g,h proven in the previous paragraph imply that
λf +( 1− λ)h  i λg +( 1− λ)h. Finally, (13) follows from (12) because (λf +( 1− λ)h)(si,·)=
λf(si,·)+(1−λ)h(si,·)=λf +(1−λ)h  and (λg+(1−λ)h)(si,·)=λg(si,·)+(1−λ)h(si,·)=
λg  +( 1− λ)h .
(Continuity) Let f ,g ,h   ∈ L 
0 be such that f    
i g  and g    
i h . We need to show
the existence of α,β ∈ (0,1) such that αf  +( 1− α)h    
i g  and g    
i βf  +( 1− β)h .T o
do this, let f,g,h ∈ L0 be such that f(si,·)=f , g(si,·)=g  and h(si,·)=h . Then, the
deﬁnition (11) of   
i shows that f  i g and g  i h. Therefore, A3 implies that there exists
α ∈ (0,1) such that αf +( 1− α)h  i g. Finally, (12) shows that αf  +( 1− α)h    
i g  because
(αf +( 1− α)h)(si,·)=αf(si,·)+( 1− α)h(si,·)=αf  +( 1− α)h . The existence of β can be
proven similarly.
(Monotonicity) We ﬁrst show that for any y,y  ∈ Y , y   
i y  if and only if y  i y .T o
do this, suppose that y   
i y  and let f,g ∈ L0 be constant acts such that (∀ω ∈ Ω) f(ω)=
y and g(ω)=y . Then, the deﬁnition (11) of   
i immediately shows that f  i g, and hence,
that y  i y . Next, suppose that y  i y . Then, it follows that y   
i y  from (12) by letting f
and g there be the constant acts deﬁned above.
We now turn to the proof of monotonicity. Let f ,g  ∈ L 
0 be such that (∀t ∈ T) f (t)   
i
g (t). We need to show that f    
i g . To do this, let f,g ∈ L0 be such that (∀s ∈ S) f(s,·)=f 14
and g(s,·)=g . Then, from the assumption that (∀t) f (t)   
i g (t), it follows that (∀ω ∈
Ω) f(ω)   
i g(ω), and hence, that (∀ω ∈ Ω) f(ω)  i g(ω) by the claim proven in the previous
paragraph. Therefore, A4 implies that f  i g, which in turn implies that f    
i g  by the
deﬁnition (11) of   
i.
(Non-degeneracy) We need to show that there exist f ,g  ∈ L 
0 such that f    
i g .T o
do this, note that there exist y∗,y ∗ ∈ Y such that y∗  0 y∗ (Step 1). Then, A7 implies that
y∗  i y∗, and hence, the ﬁrst paragraph of the proof of monotonicity shows that y∗   
i y∗, which
completes the proof.
Step 4. By the previous step, we may invoke Schmeidler’s Theorem (1989, p.578) to conclude
that for each i ∈{ 1,...,m}, there exist a unique probability capacity θsi on T and an aﬃne
function ui : Y → R, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation, such that
(∀f,g ∈ L 
0) f    







In the rest of this step, we prove (2) in the Theorem. Fix i ∈{ 1,...,n} arbitrarily.
First, we show that







To show (⇐), assume that the right-hand side of (15) holds. Then, by (14), it holds that
f(si,·)   
i g(si,·). Then, by the deﬁnition (11) of   
i, it follows that f  i g. To show (⇒), assume
that the right-hand side of (15) does not hold. Then, by (14), it holds that f(si,·)   
i g(si,·). If
f  i g holds, it must hold that f(si,·)   
i g(si,·) by (12), which contradicts the asymmetry of
  
i which was established in (Ordering) of Step 3.
Second, note that y∗  i y∗ since y∗  0 y∗ by the deﬁnitions of y∗ and y∗ (Step 1) and since
y∗  0 y∗ ⇔ y∗  i y∗ by A7. Therefore, by making a suitable positive aﬃne transformation on
ui, we may assume without loss of generality that ui(y∗) = 1 and ui(y∗)=−1. Since two aﬃne
functions which intersect at two distinct points coinside, it follows that (∀y ∈ Y ) ui(y)=u(y)
by (8), where u : Y → R is an aﬃne function deﬁned in Step 1. Therefore, we conclude that
there exist a unique class of probability capacity  θsi m
i=1 on T and an aﬃne function u : Y → R15
such that







which completes the proof of (2) in the Theorem.
Step 5. Let K ⊆ R be deﬁned by K ≡ u(Y ). Note that K is convex by the aﬃnity of u and
[−1,1] ⊆ K by (8). We denote by B0(K) the space of K-valued simple functions on S.T w o
elements, a and b,o fB0(K) are said to be comonotonic if (∀s,s  ∈ S)( a(s)−a(s ))(b(s)−b(s )) ≥





is an element of B0(K). Furthermore, for any element a of B0(K), there exists a 1st-period-
measurable act f ∈ L0 such that




(recall that we may write the outcome of a 1st-period-measurable act as f(s) instead of f(s,t)).
We deﬁne a functional I : B0(K) → R by
(∀a ∈ B0(K)) I(a)=U(f),
where f ∈ L0 is an act which satisﬁes




Such an act certainly exists by (17). In the rest of this paragraph, we show that I is well-deﬁned.








Then, (16) implies that (∀i) f ∼i g, which in turn implies that f ∼0 g by A8. We thus conclude
that U(f)=U(g) by (7).
By the deﬁnition of I, we have






In particular, when f is 1st-period-measurable, we have
U(f)=I (u(f(·))) . (19)16
Step 6. In this step, we show that the functional I deﬁned in the previous step satisﬁes all the
assumptions of Corollary of Schmeidler (1986, p.258), which proves that I can be represented
as




with some probability capacity θ0 on S. This, (18) and (7) complete the proof of (1) in the
Theorem.
(Positive Homogeneity) Let λ ∈ K. We need to show that I(λχS)=λ. To do this, let
y ∈ Y be an outcome such that u(y)=λ and let f ∈ L0 be a 1st-period-measurable act such
that (∀s) f(s)=y. Then,
I(λχS)=I (u(f(·))) = U(f)=u(y)=λ,
where the second equality holds by (19) and the third equality holds by (10).
(Comonotonic Independence) Let a,b,c ∈ B0(K) be pairwise comonotonic (see the ﬁrst
paragraph of Step 5). We need to show that for any α ∈ (0,1),
I(a) >I (b) ⇒ I(αa +( 1− α)c) >I (αb +( 1− α)c). (20)
To do this, let f,g,h be 1st-period-measurable acts such that (∀s) u(f(s)) = a(s), u(g(s)) = b(s)
and u(h(s)) = c(s). Such f, g and h certainly exist by (17). Then, f and g are comonotonic
because for any s,s  ∈ S,
f(s)  0 f(s ) ⇔ f(s)  i f(s ) ⇔ u(f(s)) >u (f(s )) ⇔ a(s) >a (s )
⇒ b(s) ≮ b(s ) ⇔ u(g(s)) ≮ u(g(s )) ⇔ g(s) ⊀i g(s ) ⇔ g(s) ⊀0 g(s ),
where the ﬁrst and last equivalences hold by A7; the second and ﬁfth equivalences hold by (16);
and the implication holds by the comonotonicity between a and b. Similarly, the other pairs
among f, g and h are comonotonic. Therefore, (20) holds because
I(a) >I (b) ⇒ I (u(f(·))) >I(u(g(·)))
⇒ U(f) >U(g)
⇒ U(αf +( 1− α)h) >U(αg +( 1− α)h)17
⇒ I (u(αf(·)+( 1− α)h(·))) >I(u(αg(·)+( 1− α)h(·)))
⇒ I (αu(f(·)) + (1 − α)u(h(·))) >I(αu(g(·)) + (1 − α)u(h(·)))
⇒ I (αa +( 1− α)c) >I(αa +( 1− α)c) ,
where the second and fourth implications hold by (19); the third implication holds by (7), the
assumption that f,g,h are 1st-period-measurable, the fact that they are pairwise comonotonic
(proven above) and A2(0); and the ﬁfth implication holds by the aﬃnity of u.
(Monotonicity) Let a,b ∈ B0(K) be such that a ≥ b. We need to prove that I(a) ≥
I(b). To do this, let f and g be 1st-period-measurable acts such that (∀s) u(f(s)) = a(s) and
u(g(s)) = b(s). Such f and g certainly exist by (17). Then, I(a) ≥ I(b) holds because
a ≥ b ⇔ (∀s) u(f(s)) ≥ u(g(s)) ⇔ (∀s) f(s)  0 g(s)
⇒ f  0 g ⇔ U(f) ≥ U(g) ⇔ I(u(f(·))) ≥ I(u(g(·))) ⇔ I(a) ≥ I(b),
where the second equivalence holds by (10) and (7); the implication holds by A4; the third
equivalence holds by (7); and fourth equivalence holds by (19). 
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